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Abstract. - We present a simple one-parameter model for spatially localised evolving agents
competing for spatially localised resources. The model considers selling agents able to evolve
their pricing strategy in competition for a fixed market. Despite its simplicity, the model displays
extraordinarily rich behaviour. In addition to “cheap” sellers pricing to cover their costs, “expen-
sive” sellers spontaneously appear to exploit short-term favourable situations. These expensive
sellers “speciate” into discrete price bands. As well as variety in pricing strategy, the “cheap”
sellers evolve a strongly correlated spatial structure, which in turn creates niches for their expen-
sive competitors. Thus an entire ecosystem of coexisting, discrete, symmetry-breaking strategies
arises.
Many economic models of marketplace interactions have
been formulated (e.g., [1–3]). Generally, these systems
assume complete information, and no transaction costs.
That is, for interacting buyers and sellers, buyers may al-
ways search the entire space of sellers (possibly with some
search cost) in order to find the best deal.
When competition is between sellers, such games gener-
ally have a stable, zero-profit (Nash) equilibrium, possibly
with multiple prices [1,3]. Despite a substantial literature
on spatial extensions to classic game theoretic models such
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [4–7], few models exist for sim-
ple marketplaces in which buyers cannot access the en-
tire seller space (some exist for real-world situations, see,
e.g., [8]). Again in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
much progress has been made by considering players which
are only adaptive by randommutation with selection [9,10]
as in ecological models [11, 12]. However, this has been
only infrequently applied to marketplace games, one model
is described in [13].
In this paper we present a simple spatial model, similar
in spirit to the Minority Game [14, 15], with limited in-
teraction distances and random mutations with selection.
The model is formulated in terms of active, evolving sell-
ers competing for passive buyers. A dual ecological model
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involves different species competing for a scarce resource.
We attempt to make the simplest possible model for
a spatially distributed market with localised information
and evolving price strategy. We consider a system of
2N interacting agents: agents are split into one of two
types, there are N selling agents (sellers) and N buying
agents (buyers). Agents are placed on a 1-dimensional
chain where each site contains a seller, and each link a
buyer. Buyers are connected to their nearest neighbours,
i.e., they have knowledge of 2 sellers (fig. 1. Each seller
has capital Ci and an unvarying price Pi. Initial prices
are drawn from Pi ∈ [1, Pmax].
Each iteration proceeds as follows:
1. All sellers’ capital is reduced by 2, the cost of produc-
ing enough stock for both possible buyers.
2. Each buyer visits the cheapest connected seller.
3. For each buyer visiting seller i, Ci increases by Pi.
4. All sellers with Ci < 0 are bankrupt: site i becomes
vacant.
5. Vacant sites are repopulated with probability γ.
6. New sellers at site i have Ci = 0.
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7. New sellers at site i take the price of an existing
seller at randomly chosen site j, Pi = Pj + dp (dp ∈
[max (−∆, 1− Pj),∆]).
Note that buyers are always present, but unlike in the
other games mentioned above, sellers’ sites might not par-
ticipate in all rounds of the game (if γ 6= 1). This allows for
local variation in the spatial structure and the availability
of supply. Sellers are assumed to know their overhead cost
(2), and will not charge below this. Stock is assumed to be
perishable and thus, any unsold stock is destroyed1. The
new sellers may be regarded either as independent sellers
adopting their strategy from successful rivals, or franchises
of those rivals.
Similarly, it is a matter of definition whether the sell-
ers are in any sense “intelligent”. A seller makes no price
adjustment between its initial appearance and bankrupcy,
so in this sense exhibits no intelligence. It may be as-
sumed to have no information about its neighbours’ strat-
egy for the upcoming round, which would in turn prevent
it from deducing an optimal strategy: as we shall see, in
the evolved state there is a high turnover of shops such
that two neighbours seldom compete for more than one
round. The sites, by contrast, do have a degree of in-
telligence, since when their strategy is observed to have
made a loss they change it to one which has been suc-
cessful elsewhere. There is strong evidence that indepen-
dent businesses do indeed adopt known successful business
plans, or that “best practice” within a franchise spreads
from one location to another.
There are three parameters in the model, Pmax, ∆, and
γ. Pmax is simply a boundary on the initial conditions; as
we shall see, for reasonable values, the mutation step ∆
affects only the timescale of reaching equilibrium: γ is the
only parameter which governs system behaviour.
We will show that this model produces very complex
behaviour, with a range of discrete but non-symmetric
strategies emerging. Before doing so, we discuss what
would be expected from a mean field approach.
The classic analysis for this type of demand limited com-
petition [16] suggests that prices will be driven down to
the “Bertrand equilibrium”, a level that recoups the pro-
duction cost, here P0 = 1. With the current model, there
is insufficient demand to support all sellers at this price,
thus there will be dead sites whose number may be esti-
mated.
Initially, consider the case where the system is already
in the Bertrand equilibrium: let the price of each seller be
chosen randomly from a uniform distribution P ∈ [1, 1+δ],
with small variation: δ ∼ ∆ ≪ 1. In order to survive a
round, each seller must sell all its stock.
Consider a live seller, at the beginning of a round it will
be in one of three situations:
1. Both neighbouring sellers are dead.
1Alternately, stock could have negligible value compared to fixed
costs
PSfrag replacements
S1 S2 S3 SN· · ·
Fig. 1: Diagram of buyer-seller connections in 1D. Buyers and
sellers are shown by black squares and open circles respectively.
Arrows indicate the sellers an individual buyer may visit
2. One neighbouring seller is dead, while the other is
alive.
3. Both neighbouring sellers are alive.
Let α be the proportion of live sellers at the beginning of
the round, then we can write the probability of each of the
three cases as: p1 = (1−α)
2, p2 = 2α(1−α), and p3 = α
2.
In order to survive, the seller must either be in situation
(1), or in situation (2) or (3) and outcompeting the live
sellers. This gives a survival probability (given the uniform
price distribution) of ps = p1+
p2
2 +p3
∫ 1
0 (1−x)
2dx = α
2
3 −
α+1. The proportion surviving is hence f(α) = α(α2/3−
α + 1). Thus, with γ = 12 , at the beginning of the next
round, the proportion of live sites is 12 (1 + f(α)); in the
steady state, this must be equal to α. Solving numerically
gives the proportion of live sites in the steady state as
αss ≈ 0.66.
An alternative assumption is to search for Nash equi-
librium of the game. Although our agents are constrained
to have fixed price (so-called pure strategies) it is known
that the ensemble average at a Nash equilibrium of pure
strategies is the same as the time-average for mixed strate-
gies, provided the pure agents do not know which strategy
they are playing against [17]. Thus we might guess that
out distribution of prices will resemble the mixed Nash
equilibrium for the non-spatial game.
In this analysis, we assume that there is a distribution
of prices f(p) which includes the Bertrand price P0. In
Nash equilibrium with mixed strategies, all strategies have
the same payoff - since P0 has zero payoff, other strategies
which offer zero payoff are included. Since all prices below
P0 always lose, we need consider only higher prices:
∫
∞
pi
(pi − 1)f(p)dp =
∫ pi
1
f(p)dp (1)
whence f(p) = 1/p2. This approach ignores the possibil-
ity that sites are unoccupied. We may include this in the
analysis by allowing an unoccupied site, paying no over-
head, to be part of the strategy (it has the same payoff
as P0). It turns out, however, that the mixed strategy
equilibrium does not contain this particular pure strat-
egy: let the probability that a site plays be η, now suppose
that an opposing site chooses to play with probability β.
In order to maximize our expected profit, we should now
choose η > β (cashing in when our opponent plays dead).
Equally, however, our opponent should choose β > η, to
p-2
Strategy bifurcation in a model of competing sellers
maximize her expected profit. Thus, the equilibrium situ-
ation is for both players to choose η = β = 1, i.e., to play
every round.
Simulated results with initial prices seeded close to the
Bertrand equilibrium show that the mean field assump-
tion is invalid. We find α = 0.71 ± 0.01 in the steady
state, which does not agree with the prediction for αss.
Closer examination of the structure of the steady state in
simulation shows that there is a high degree of correlation
in placement of sellers. If the steady-state were a mean
field, we would expect p(n) ≈ αss ∀n. As can be seen in
fig. 3, this is evidently not the case. An ordered array of
“supercheap” sellers on alternate sites forms with prices
very close to P0: Pi−P0 ≪ ∆. The presence of such an ar-
ray is stable against intrusion in the intermediate sites, as
a putative new seller opening there must be cheaper than
both neighbours, and both their eventual replacements to
survive.
The fully correlated case, where every other seller is su-
percheap, has αss = 0.75, while the uncorrelated case has
αss ≈ 0.66. In between the two extremes is the actual sit-
uation. With random initial conditions, many correlated
regions develop at the same time. In order for them to
match at their boundaries, they must nucleate in phase,
otherwise they form an antiphase boundary which can-
not be removed by the addition or removal of a single
supercheap seller (fig. 3). Thus the Bertrand “equilib-
rium” is locally stable to small perturbations, although
some spatial structure is already visible (fig. 3).
Simulation of the model with a wider range of initial
prices shows that the global steady-state is a good deal
more complex: a range of high-price sellers coexist with
the cheap ones: fig. 2. These sellers exploit temporary
monopoly situations where adjacent sites are dead.
This extraordinary behaviour is at variance with a con-
ventional demand-limited picture, and can be likened to
biological speciation. Several distinct seller types emerge,
which cannot mutate into one another. The expensive
sellers need not have an infinite lifetime: because of the
replicator dynamics it suffices that each should be repli-
cated once in its average lifetime.
Due to the highly correlated environment which expen-
sive sellers occupy, a mean field analysis is insufficient. In-
stead, consider the first band (P = 2) of expensive sellers
in 1D: these survive if they sell to, on average, one buyer
per turn. The possible changes in the capital C of such an
expensive seller, assuming its neighbours are cheap, are:
1. ∆C = P − 1 if both neighbouring sellers are dead,
2. ∆C = P/2− 1 if one neighbour is dead and the other
is alive,
3. ∆C = −1 if both neighbours are alive.
C therefore carries out a random walk halting when the
capital becomes negative. The na¨ıve guess is that this
walk is biased in favour of the negative step; one might
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Fig. 2: Steady state price distribution for N = 105 and N =
106, γ = 1
2
, Pmax = 8, ∆ = 0.04, price shown in units of
P0, y axis is absolute number of shops. Insets shows evolution
of the P = 2 band to a steady state for N = 105, y axis is
fraction of total shops. Note that main figure is a log-linear
plot, while insets are linear. (a) is after 100 timesteps, (b)
after 500, and (c) in the steady state. A sharp band forms
initially above P = 2 which creates a niche for shops with
prices P < 2, the band then migrates downward and broadens
to that in (c). Data binned by rounding to 3 decimal places,
and subsequently smoothed with a 5 point average. The main
features of the graph are size independent and reproducible (as
shown), and sharpen with reduced ∆
expect that p1 = (1 − α)
2, p2 = 2α(1 − α), and p3 = α
2
with α ≈ 0.68. However, simulation tells us that the mean
lifetime of expensive sellers scales with the lifetime of the
game, our na¨ıve guess must therefore be incorrect.
It turns out that the long-lived expensive sellers occupy
favourable niches: the “supercheap” sites of the correlated
phase, i.e., their second neighbours are supercheap. In
the limiting case, this means that their first neighbour
competitors are dead 50% of the time. This changes the
step direction bias in the random walk described above
since the probabilities primarily depend on γ rather than
α: the mean lifetime of such a walk with γ ≤ 12 is infinite.
These niches would appear to allow arbitrarily high
prices, and any seller charging ≥ 2 to survive. However,
one can apply the ideas of Bertrand competition to the
expensive sellers: on a long enough timescale they will set
up adjacent to one another, and capital will be transferred
to the cheaper seller.
The discrete trading rounds mean that integer prices
will have better short term survival prospects: e.g., a sale
to one buyer at 4 in the first trading period will ensure
survival for two rounds, while 3.9 will only survive one. In
this scenario with two potential buyers, the advantage for
odd integer price is less: e.g., a price of 3 has to sell twice
to survive an extra round compared with 2. If one starts
with a homogenous distribution of initial prices, this leads
to “speciation”: symmetry breaking in the preferred price
band favouring marginally above integer value, fig. 2. Re-
markably, once the speciation has occured, the character
p-3
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Fig. 3: Migration of phase boundaries and correlation amongst
cheap shops over time. Each row represents one site (after re-
birth), coloured according to price. A dead site is black; a site
with P ∈ [1, 1.00004) is white; a site with P ∈ [1.00004, 1.008)
is grey; a site with P ∈ [1.008, 1.28) is blue. Each column rep-
resents one timestep, the picture shows around 300 timesteps
in total
of the competition changes again. “Intraspecies” competi-
tion between sellers in the same price band becomes crit-
ical, and prices below the integer values become viable,
until a balance is reached between intra- and inter-species
competition.
Although this analysis requires that trading rounds be
discrete, the main features (heavily favoured prices) are
still present if trading happens in a stochastic manner.
For stochastic dynamics, a buyer is chosen at random to
go shopping, and a seller is chosen at random to pay an
overhead, this is repeated such that the expected num-
ber of times a buyer goes shopping is one, this completes
one trading round. The bankruptcy and rebirth dynam-
ics procede as before. Since buyers may now visit a seller
more than once, there is no upper bound on the amount
of stock a seller may sell, we therefore set the quantity of
stock to ∞, and thus the marginal cost to zero. Despite
this, prices at integer multiples of P = 1 are still favoured
(fig. 4).
We may remove a further restriction on the original
model by not requiring that sellers charge above the
marginal cost. In this case, favoured prices still ex-
ist, and do so for a range of connectivities: for a seller
with d potential buyers (paying an overhead d), prices of
P = dn/m, n,m ∈ Z+ are favoured (fig. 4 inset), corre-
sponding to attracting m/n buyers on average per round.
We now consider whether such expensive sellers are in
some sense beneficial. Due to the existence of dead sites
and the limited interaction distance, demand is not com-
pletely satisfied. The introduction of a wider range of
prices results in both a larger total population and more
demand being satisfied.
The dependence of the lifetimes of the expensive sellers
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Fig. 4: Steady state price distribution for stochastic dynamics
with N = 4 × 104, γ = 1
2
, ∆ = 0.04. Distribution averaged
over final state of 20 ensembles, error bars show standard error
in mean. Inset shows steady state price distribution for dis-
crete trading rounds and no minimum price for connectivities
of (a) 4, and (b) 7 buyers per seller (overhead of 4 and 7 re-
spectively), the peaks at 4 and 7 in (a) and (b) correspond to
sellers attracting one buyer
on γ tells us that this parameter may be used to char-
acterize the distribution. In the limit γ → 1 all sellers
charge the Bertrand price, as there is is never any chance
of expensive sellers being the only option for consumers.
Equally, γ = 0 leads to an essentially random distribution
of sellers (depending on initial conditions). In between
these two extremes, we expect some kind of transition
from a regime with expensive sellers to one without around
γ = 12 : if γ <
1
2 the random walk of the expensive sell-
ers is biased in favour of the upward, profit-making step,
allowing them to survive indefinitely.
By monitoring fluctuations in a simulation we can see
that the system undergoes a transition at a critical value
of γ ≈ 12 in which the variance in the number of live sellers
diverges (fig. 5).
We see further evidence of a transition when consid-
ering the mean unsatisfied demand, being approximately
constant for γ < 12 and quadratic for γ >
1
2 (fig. 6). If
there were no transition, we would expect the demand to
be quadratic in γ for all values: this is indeed the case if we
force the system into a Bertrand steady state by specifying
initial conditions accordingly.
The system has a metastable regime for γ < 12 . If
the initial conditions only sample the Bertrand regime
(P ≈ 1), then it remains in such a steady state indefi-
nitely. Equally, if the initial conditions sample the whole
price spectrum, then the final steady state contains mul-
tiple price bands. In order for the system to escape from
the Bertrand state, it requires a nucleation of expensive
sellers which cannot happen through mutations in prices
(due to adverse selective pressures on intermediate prices).
Equally, for small system sizes, fluctuations may eliminate
high price bands which cannot be repopulated.
p-4
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Fig. 5: Variance in the time-averaged mean of the fraction
of live sellers (before rebirth) as a function of γ, N = 104,
smoothed using 5 point average separately above and below
γ = 0.5. Inset shows the fraction of expensive shops (after
rebirth) as a function of γ
According to Nash [18], it is possible for multiple strate-
gies to coexist provided that no individual can do any bet-
ter by changing their strategy. In our system, changes in
price at a site are discontinuous, as are changes in the
competing strategies of the neighbours (each changes only
when the shop’s capital goes to zero). These discrete, lo-
calised changes prevent the system finding a perfect Nash
equilibrium. To apply the notion of a Nash equilibrium
one has to assume that the evolution of prices is equivalent
to the sites behaving as rational agents: it is possible that
this is the case only in the infinite time limit, not reached
by our simulations. Another hypothesis about evolving,
replicating systems is that the system as a whole organises
to maximise the number of replicators (here, sellers) [19].
In fig. 6 we see good evidence for this: the expensive sell-
ers become viable when they are able to increase the total
number of living sellers above the Bertrand solution. A
side effect of this is to minimise the unsatisfied demand.
We have shown that the obvious generalization of a
classic Bertrand-Edgeworth game has some surprising re-
sults. The classical Bertrand equilibrium is not necessarily
reached, as the system is able to self-organise to produce
niches where different strategies can flourish. Further, we
have shown that random mutation and selection can (in
the case of restricted initial conditions) produce the ex-
pected Nash result. That is, sellers need not be active in
selecting strategies, the selective force against badly per-
forming members is enough to bring the system to equi-
librium.
The spontaneous production of evolutionary niches in
an initially homogeneous space has strong parallels in evo-
lutionary ecology. We can envisage a similar situation
where the “sellers” become individuals foraging for food.
The “cheap sellers” represent foragers which are efficient
at finding the food, but have a high metabolic rate and
need to feed often. The “expensive sellers” are less effi-
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Fig. 6: Time-averaged unsatisfied demand as a function of the
birth rate, γ, in enforced Bertrand steady state (green) and
multiple price steady state (blue), N = 104, mean taken as a
time average over 2 × 104 timesteps after the steady state is
reached. Inset shows corresponding fraction of live sites after
rebirth for Bertrand (green) and non-Bertrand (blue) steady
state. Error bars show standard error in the mean
cient at foraging, but can survive for longer on the same
amount of food.
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